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Yes, it is, according to Simeon Djankov. He notes that public expenditures had risen to
dangerously high levels in some Southern and Western European countries even prior to the
eurozone crisis and argues that the European Central Bank’s loose monetary policy since 2012 has
provided public sectors with little incentive to modernise. This, in turn, may be helping to fuel
Eurosceptic rhetoric.
The eurozone crisis, the rise of nationalist parties across Europe and the Brexit vote have all
pointed to significant vulnerabilities in the European social model. Europe is home to only 8 per cent
of the world’s population, yet it produces 50 per cent of global social payments (public pensions, healthcare benefits,
maternity leave and associated benefits, public education and access to subsidized public transport). These social
benefits come at a large cost, typically covered by high taxation and chronic budget deficits. Dissatisfaction with
these costs has risen among taxpayers, especially when social benefits are lavished on immigrants. Nationalist
movements in Nordic and Central European countries, and most recently in the United Kingdom have gathered
support aimed at curtailing such expenditure.
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Is Europe spending too much? The answer is yes. Public expenditures had risen to dangerously high levels in some
Southern and Western European countries even prior to the eurozone crisis. As an average share of EU GDP, they
reached 50.3 per cent in 2009. By 2015, they had declined to 47.4 per cent of GDP. In contrast, they were 35 per
cent in the United States and 34 per cent in Switzerland in 2015.
In 2015, public expenditures in various EU countries ranged from 35 to 58 per cent of GDP. The highest public
expenditures as a share of GDP were to be found in Finland (58 per cent), France (57 per cent), Denmark (56 per
cent), Greece (55 per cent), and Belgium (54 per cent). At the other end, Ireland, Lithuania, and Romania had public
expenditures of 35 per cent of GDP. The United Kingdom was in the middle of the European Union membership on
public expenditures, with 43 per cent of GDP.
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Higher public expenditures tend to lead to large budget deficits and rising public debts. In 2015, the average EU
public debt was 88 per cent of GDP, far above the Maastricht ceiling of 60 per cent of GDP imposed on all European
Union members. This is one of the consistent criticisms levied at the EU by nationalist parties and movements like
the Leave campaign in the United Kingdom: that European leaders do not follow their own rules.
There was a temporary respite from increased spending in 2009-2012. The fiscal tightening after the eurozone
crisis went along with pursuing structural reforms to improve public finances across Europe. In this period, two-thirds
of European Union members have managed at least one significant reform in the pension, healthcare or public
education sectors.
Since 2012 however, the increasingly loose monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) has slowed down
progress towards more balanced public spending. The ECB has committed to buy each month from €60bn to €80bn
of EU bonds to increase liquidity in Europe. It also expanded the range of assets it would buy to include high-quality
corporate bonds. This loose monetary policy has allowed European governments to borrow at very low or no cost,
reducing their incentive to modernise the social sectors. In some cases, for example Italy, previously-initiated
reforms were aborted.
In the meantime the ECB has aggressively cut interest rates to spur consumption and investment, moving into
negative territory in 2014 and charging banks 0.4 percent to hold their cash overnight since March 2016. Sweden
and Denmark have also adopted negative rates, weakening their currencies in the process. The main result of
negative interest rates is clear: governments are more willing to incur additional debt and spend money. Denmark is
an example, with the budget deficit projected to reach 2.5 percent of GDP in 2016, after the government managed to
reach a surplus two years earlier.
There are some differences in the reach of loose monetary policy across Europe, especially among Eurozone and
non-Eurozone countries. These differences are exploited in a new project by the Financial Markets Group at the
London School of Economics and the insurer Swiss Re, which are conducting comparative analysis on the effects of
loose monetary policy on structural reforms. Among the main questions are the systemic risk implications of a low
interest rate environment; which types of structural reforms are abandoned during a period of easy money; and how
can European countries come out of a period of loose monetary policy.
Answering these questions helps not only forecast public expenditures in Europe, but also project economic growth,
which has faltered since the Eurozone crisis. If higher growth materializes, optimizing spending may be easier to
achieve.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article was originally published at our sister site LSE Business Review and it gives the views of
the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. 
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